Epistemic reduction of the concept of ‘decision’
Epistemic reduction of the concept of ‘decision’By: Daniel Burnston (Tulane University) Abstract: “Reduction” is a widely rejected view of how commonsense psychological notions relate to neuroscience. I argue that there is a particular view of reduction on which reduction of the key commonsense concept of ‘decision’ is a live option. In particular, I advance a…
Reasoning Goals and Representational Decisions in Computational Cognitive Neuroscience: Lessons From the Drift Diffusion Model
Reasoning Goals and Representational Decisions in Computational Cognitive Neuroscience: Lessons From the Drift Diffusion ModelBy: Ari Khoudary (UC Irvine), Megan A.K. Peters (UC Irvine), & Aaron Bornstein (UC Irvine) Abstract: Computational cognitive models are powerful tools for enhancing the quantitative and theoretical rigor of cognitive neuroscience. It is thus imperative that model users—researchers who develop…
How Might a ‘Philosopher’s Toolkit’ Help Advance Neuroscience? Let’s Ask Some Neuroscientists
By: John Bickle, Patricia Churchland, Stuart Firestein, Michael N. Lehman, David J. Parker, Alcino J. Silva, Bradley J. Walters, and Robert W. Williams Abstract: In the terms adopted by the editors of this special issue concerning how a ‘philosopher’s toolkit’ might contribute to progress in neuroscience, this paper reports posing that question to several neuroscientists,…
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