On a New Content Indeterminacy Problem in Neuroscience
By Caitlin MaceDepartment of History and Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of Pittsburgh Find Caitlin’s recently published paper in Philosophical Psychology here. Abstract Whether neurons represent or play a mere causal role is a foundational issue in philosophy of neuroscience. Evidence that neurons perform a representational role is weakened by the possibility of explaining experimental results by…
Epistemic reduction of the concept of ‘decision’
Epistemic reduction of the concept of ‘decision’By: Daniel Burnston (Tulane University) Abstract: “Reduction” is a widely rejected view of how commonsense psychological notions relate to neuroscience. I argue that there is a particular view of reduction on which reduction of the key commonsense concept of ‘decision’ is a live option. In particular, I advance a…
Reasoning Goals and Representational Decisions in Computational Cognitive Neuroscience: Lessons From the Drift Diffusion Model
Reasoning Goals and Representational Decisions in Computational Cognitive Neuroscience: Lessons From the Drift Diffusion ModelBy: Ari Khoudary (UC Irvine), Megan A.K. Peters (UC Irvine), & Aaron Bornstein (UC Irvine) Abstract: Computational cognitive models are powerful tools for enhancing the quantitative and theoretical rigor of cognitive neuroscience. It is thus imperative that model users—researchers who develop…
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